Nuclear submarine underwater3/1/2024 ![]() The bottom line is that, while the rollout of the larger-capacity SSB and prospect of further conversions provides a credible path for a future (albeit theater-focused) sub-launched missile force, such a force will almost certainly continue to play second fiddle to the much larger, still growing, and much more survivable land-based ballistic and cruise missile force. That vision also still includes developing nuclear-powered submarines, to which Kim said, “…we should give greater impetus.” But the speech seems to recognize such a capability will be a long time coming, barring substantial Chinese and/or Russian technical assistance.This is strangely reminiscent of the Eisenhower Administration’s “New Look” strategy from the mid-1950s that relied on nuclear weapons as a less economically costly alternative to large conventional forces. Kim’s vision for the future of the Navy is heavily focused on it “going nuclear,” including explicitly for reasons of cost-effectiveness. ![]() Deploying additional road-mobile missiles will almost certainly remain a more cost-effective and more survivable way for North Korea to add to its nuclear strike capability. Work on future conversions is likely to be slow-going-probably at least five years per boat. But it remains to be seen how many ROMEOs are actually converted into missile subs and how long that might take, given North Korea’s limited shipbuilding capacity. This combination of more subs carrying more missiles is probably North Korea’s best option to obtain a large enough sea-based deterrent to be militarily significant. Kim apparently also intends to convert “all” of the North’s remaining ROMEOs (up to 19) to the new configuration, raising the prospect of a future force carrying up to 80 SLBMs and 120 LACMs.Deployment close to North Korea will also be the best way to mitigate the extremely high vulnerability of the old-tech, very noisy sub-increased by the sub’s various modifications-to allied anti-submarine warfare (ASW). The Pukguksong-1, -3, and LACM could cover all of South Korea and Japan, and US bases there, from North Korean territorial waters the KN-23 would be largely limited to South Korea. This shift ’in an SSB’s mission from strategic to “tactical” is consistent with North Korea’s emphasis on “tactical nukes” over the past few years for propaganda and deterrent purposes.The larger tubes could not accommodate the North’s newer, larger Pukguksong-4, -5 and probable -6 SLBMs. The missile section is much longer, containing four launch tubes for SLBMs of about the same diameter as the 1,250-kilometer (KM) range Pukguksong-1 or 1,900-km range and Pukguksong-3 (which could also accommodate the smaller-diameter KN-23 short-range ballistic missile ), and six launch tubes most likely for the 0.5-0.6-meter (m) diameter, 2,000-km-range Hwasal-2 land-attack cruise missile (LACM). The most significant remodifications focused on accommodating more missiles.However, extensive modifications appear to have been made after that site visit. ![]() At that stage, the new submarine was expected to be configured to carry three submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launch tubes.
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